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Abstract
Natural disasters plague the populations of many countries, and the international commu-
nity often seeks to alleviate the human su¤ering by means of humanitarian aid. Do natural
disasters also have negative e¤ects on aggregate economic growth? This paper shows that
natural disasters on average have a positive association with subsequent economic perfor-
mance. This overall positive association is driven by the experience of democratic developing
countries that receive humanitarian aid.
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1 Introduction
In the early afternoon of May 12, 2008, a powerful earthquake caused mayhem in Chengdu,
the capital of the Chinese province of Sichuan. The epicenter of this Richters scale magnitude
8.0 earthquake (henceforth M8.0), was 80 kilometers west-northwest of the city. Tremors were
reported as far away as Shanghai, at a distance of 1,700 kilometers. 15 million people lived in
the a¤ected area, and 70,000 was killed. In stark contrast to the human su¤ering, the Chinese
GDP was expected to grow by an additional 0.3 percentage points as a consequence of the
earthquake, according to o¢ cial estimates made by the State Information Center of China, a
Chinese government policy think tank.
Natural disasters are events such as oods, windstorms, extreme temperatures, wildres,
droughts, earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions. The main common feature of these
events, that separates them from other forms of disasters, is that they are triggered by hazardous
natural events. Natural disasters are often equated with heavy losses and human su¤ering.
From that perspective, the possibility of positive growth e¤ects seems counterintuitive. There
are, however, good reasons not to expect all natural disasters to cause macro-economic losses.
Disasters can give a boost by attracting new resources to a country, incentivize increased e¤orts
in una¤ected areas, or by allowing a more rational infrastructure to be built.
The existing literature on the economic e¤ects of natural disasters is not conclusive - some
studies nd that growth after natural disasters is slower, others the exact opposite. There is
even disagreement about whether the emerging consesus in the literature is that the e¤ects
are on average positive (Crespo Cuaresma et al. 2008), or negative (Cavallo and Noy 2010).
This disagreement may be partly explained by inadequate attention to the apparent endogenous
nature of natural disaster losses.
This paper investigates the e¤ects of natural disasters on aggregate economic growth from
1965 to the present. We rst provide a brief informal analysis of key methodological issues
in previous studies, and how these may have biased the results. In the subsequent empirical
analysis, we take particular care to maintain a representative sample, to control for unobserved
heterogeneity, and to address endogeneity.
This paper contributes to the literature by showing that there is a positive association be-
tween natural disasters and subsequent economic performance, in the short run, in the medium
run, and in the long run . A signicant methodological contribution is that we identify in-
struments that can be used to address potential endogeneity in analyses using reported natural
disasters data from sources such as EM-DAT (2010). This approach allows us to conclude that
the positive long-term e¤ects of natural disasters are causal. We propose that the overall positive
association is driven by the dynamics in democratic developing countries, and that the inow
of humanitarian aid is a key factor in determining when natural disasters can result in such
positive e¤ects. The e¤ect in developed countries is neutral.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ndings, theory, and
empirical methods used in previous research, and outlines the empirical framework later used
in the present paper. After a discussion about what natural disaster are in Section 3, Section 4
further describes the empirical strategy, the data, and presents the empirical results. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2
2 Previous research
2.1 Findings
At present, there is no agreement in the literature on neither the size or the sign of the e¤ects
of natural disasters.1 The modern literature on the economic e¤ects of natural disasters started
with Albala-Bertrand (1993). Using a small sample of countries that had experienced natural
disasters, he found a mild positive e¤ect, but only in the short run. More recently, Skidmore
and Toya (2002) also nd positive e¤ects, but now on long-run growth. They argued that the
cause of these positive e¤ects was gains from Schumpeterian creative destruction, a mechanism
which is explicitly examined, and refuted, by Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2008). The most solid
of the recent slate of studies is Loayza et al. (2009), and they nd no signicant medium-run
e¤ects of disasters in general. Depending on economic sector and disaster type, the e¤ects can
even range from positive to negative, and while moderate disasters may have a positive e¤ect
on some economic sectors, severe disasters generally do not. Exactly how, or why, this is the
case is left unexplained. A study strongly advocating that the growth e¤ects of natural disasters
really is negative is Noy (2009). He nds that natural disasters hurt growth in the short term
but have almost no e¤ect in the long run. The negative e¤ects of disaster damages apply only
to developing countries, while the e¤ects in the OECD sample are positive. The idea that
developing countries may be more sensitive is supported by ndings in Loayza et al. (2009).
A strand of the literature is focused on extreme events, and here the nding is typically
that natural disasters have negative e¤ects on the aggregate economy. Looking at the e¤ects
of very large natural disasters in low-income economies, Raddatz (2007) nds that climatic and
humanitariandisasters have diverse e¤ects but that geological disasters do not. However, using
a similar method, Melecky and Raddatz (2011) nd no average e¤ects on output, even from large
natural disasters. Cavallo et al. (2010) study the impact of a limited set of very severe disasters
and compare them with similar country-years where no disaster occurred. Only extremely large
disasters have negative output e¤ects, and then only when followed by political turmoil. The
results in Cavallo et al. (2010) and Melecky and Raddatz (2011) are interesting in that they
nd that even the negative e¤ect of very serious disasters lacks robustness, thus questioning the
results in Loayza et al. (2009).
2.2 Mechanisms
Several possible mechanism behind these contradicting empirical patterns have been discussed
in the literature. The treatment is mostly informal, with a notable exception in Loayza et al.
(2009). On one hand, disasters are in their model hypothesized to have negative e¤ects due
to adverse e¤ects on total factor productivity and the supply of inputs. On the other hand,
when more capital than labor is destroyed, implying a lower capital to labor ratio, countries
are shifted further from their steady states. Short-term growth should result as the return to
1The present lack of agreement on both size and sign of the growth e¤ects of natural disasters is well reected
in the following quotes. Most of the research [on the short-run response to natural disasters] tends to nd that
gross domestic product (GDP) increases after the occurrence of a natural disaster (Crespo Cuaresma et al.,
2008). [...] the emerging consensus in the literature is that natural disasters have, on average, a negative impact
on short-term economic growth(Cavallo and Noy, 2010).
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capital is higher.
In a like-minded, but informal discussion, Melecky and Raddatz (2011) agree that a de-
struction of capital reduces the amount of output that can be produced given the amount of
labor. They add that there can be positive e¤ects on the incentive to work as people are inter-
temporally poorer. If there is an increase in government spending, and the multiplier is large
enough, the overall e¤ect on output can be positive.
Cavallo et al. (2010) discuss possible e¤ects using a wider set of standard growth theories.
In traditional neoclassical models, similar to the one in Loayza et al. (2009), technology is
independent of capital. Disasters that destroy physical or human capital push countries further
from their steady-states and can for that reason positively a¤ect growth. The results are more
complex in endogenous growth models. When these incorporate increasing returns to technology
in production, the destruction of capital can have lasting negative e¤ects. If constant returns
to scale are assumed, the e¤ect is no change to the growth rate. Further, in models with
Schumpeterian creative destruction, the e¤ects can be positive as disasters force upgrading and
allow for re-optimization of capital and infrastructure.
In addition to these arguments, which are standard in the literature, a distinction that
deserves attention is the relative e¤ect on the disaster zone and on other areas in the country.
The disaster zone can experience a costly disruption of economic activities. In contrast, the need
for assistance and reconstruction can lead to increased economic activity in areas outside the
disaster zone. The sign on the net e¤ect on the national level can be either negative or positive.
A related mechanism is that idle capacity in una¤ected areas can substitute for production in
the disaster zone to at least limit the negative e¤ects on the national level.2
Insights can be drawn from the literature on natural disasters and conict. Most empirical
studies nd that natural disasters make violent conict more likely (Nel and Righarts 2008).
This would suggest mostly negative e¤ects on economic performance. However, according to
another prevalent view, some natural disasters contribute to defuse tensions. They do so by
binding people to a common fate. When everyone share a goal of successful reconstruction,
previous disagreements may seem relatively unimportant (Schubert et al. 2007). If natural
disasters can unite societies and allow the social and political system to focus on what is good
for society as a whole, then overall economic performance could improve as well.
To sum up, the potential mechanisms pointing to a negative e¤ect include the destruction
of factors of production, which lowers productive capacity, the destruction of supporting in-
frastructure, which lowers returns to remaining factors of production, and political instability,
which reduces the incentives to invest and produce. Positive e¤ects are to expect from the local
demand for assistance and reconstruction, whereby production in surrounding areas increases, a
process of unication or reconciliation, which increases investment and production via reduced
uncertainty and a more positive outlook, an inow of international aid and increased attention,
and, nally, creative destruction. The last of these point to the possibility of building a more ra-
tional infrastructure or industrial structure. The fact that destruction precedes construction has
lead to expectations that natural disasters should be associated with recessions in the short-run
2 In a study of the economic consequences of the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, Horwich (2000) nds such
e¤ects at work. Part of the reason that the e¤ect on Japans economy was modest was that there were other
regions with idle capacity.
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but positive e¤ects later on.
A growing literature focuses on what determines the direct losses in natural disasters. It
has been found that rich countries report fewer deaths and lower economic and human losses,
even if they do not experience fewer or weaker natural disasters (Kahn 2004, Strömberg 2007,
Toya and Skidmore 2007). The reason is that they can a¤ord better housing, warning systems,
medical care, and evacuation plans (Strömberg 2007).
It is less clear whether losses are lower in countries with more solid democratic systems,
even if that is what one would expect a priori. On the one hand, Kahn (2004) and Toya and
Skidmore (2007) nd that losses are lower in countries that are more democratic and have better
institutions. On the other hand, Strömberg (2007) nds that the number of killed is actually
higher in more democratic countries, once government e¤ectiveness is held constant. He suggests
that this can be explained by more complete reporting by democracies.
2.3 Empirical Frameworks in the Literature
The great variation in results in the studies of the growth e¤ects of natural disasters can be
explained by particular choices of empirical methods, samples, and natural disaster indicators.
An important distinction is that between what we can call event indicators and loss in-
dicators. Event indicators capture the number, or the incidence, of natural disasters. These
indicators are sometimes normalized by country size (area). Loss indicators capture the num-
ber of a¤ected or killed, or the direct economic damages. These are typically normalized by
country size (population or GDP). The loss indicators are heavily skewed, a problem that is
sometimes addressed by including them in log form. In some cases, loss data is used to con-
struct new event indicators, e.g., by counting the number of disasters over some threshold level
of severity.3 Studies that use loss indicators or indicators of severe disasters more often tend
to nd negative e¤ects of natural disasters than studies that use event indicators.4 This could
reect non-linearities in the true e¤ects, or that endogeneity is a more serious problem when
loss indicators are used. I return to this topic below.
There is clearly a lack of consensus also about the most appropriate econometric method. The
techniques range from standard cross-sectional ordinary least squares (Skidmore and Toya 2002),
to panel vector autoregression (Raddatz 2007, 2009, Melecky and Raddatz 2011), Hausman-
Taylor random e¤ects (Noy 2009), system-GMM (Loayza 2009), and comparative case studies
3Noy (2009) uses loss indicators, mainly damages, as a fraction of GDP, and nds negative e¤ects on growth.
Ramcharan (2007) uses a dummy for if a windstorm occurred, and the value of the magnitude if an earthquake
occurred. Raddatz (2007, 2009), on the other hand, uses the number of very large natural disasters weighted by
area. Toya and Skidmore (2002) use the frequency of natural disasters over the period from 1960 to 1990. Anbarci
et al. (2005) have a limited list of earthquake that caused a disaster, and use magnitude as their indicator. Loayza
et al. (2009) use combinations of event and loss indicators, where events are disasters in which the number of
killed plus 0.3 times the number a¤ected amounts to more than 0.01 percent of the population. As severethey
code the top 10% of natural disasters according to intensity(Loayza et al. 2009:24). What intensity refers to,
or if 10%refers to the full sample, the sample of recorded disasters, or the sample of distasters where data on
severity is actually available is not specied.
4 It is not uncommon that the sample is constrained along the key independent variable, see, e.g., Raddatz
(2009) and Hochrainer (2009). Di¤erent methods are used, but they all imply that countries in which, for whatever
reason, there are no hazardous natural events, or where the society is capable of limiting the e¤ects to be below
the threshold used by the author, are systematically dropped from the sample. The validity of this approach rests
on the strong assumption that the macroeconomic e¤ects are orthogonal to the incidence of natural hazards, to
disaster preparedness, and to the response capacity of the society in which the event takes place.
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(Cavallo et al. 2010). These techniques are similar in only one important aspect their validity
rest on the assumption that natural disasters are exogenous to economic development.5
Sometimes the argument is rst made that natural disasters can be viewed as exogenous
events, and then the empirical analysis employs a large set of control variables that e¤ectively
limit the potential sample, see, e.g., Loayza et al. (2009) and Noy (2009).6 If these smaller
samples are representative, and under the exogeneity assumption, the reduction in sample size
only leads to unnecessarily imprecise estimates. However, if the inclusion of these control vari-
ables, that mostly capture macroeconomic characteristics, systematically discriminate against
certain types of countries, or countries temporarily under certain forms of stress, the estimates
can be severely biased. Though rarely explicitly stated, a high number of control variables is
motivated by concerns about an omitted variables bias. If natural disasters were truly exoge-
nous events there would be no omitted variables bias in the estimate for natural disasters. As
that assumption is generally made, implicitly or explicitly, the controls could be dropped. The
analysis could instead be made on a more representative sample.
2.4 Empirical Framework
The empirical framework used in this paper was chosen to address a few key methodological
problems in previous studies. First, since there are more severe disasters in poor countries,
standard OLS estimates will have a negative bias. As a partial solution, the time-invariant
component of this e¤ect is removed.
Second, a standard assumption is that natural disasters can be treated as exogenous. The
event indicators are clearly less problematic in this respect than are the loss indicators. For
instance, high magnitude earthquakes become reported natural disasters in most inhabited areas,
but they have severe e¤ects, with high values on the loss indicators, only in vulnerable societies.
This motivates the use of event indicators, and when these are used the omitted variables bias
will be less serious than if loss indicators were used. When the potential omitted variables bias is
less of a problem, there is less need to include a wide set of sample size-limiting control variables.
For this reason, and in order to maintain a sample that is as representative as is possible, most
specications will include only a limited number of key control variables.
To address endogeneity directly, one can use in instrumental variables estimations. The main
di¢ culty with that approach is always to nd instruments that are informative and valid. The
analysis in this paper uses data on seismic events, the natural shocks that trigger earthquakes
and other geophysical disasters.7
5Some studies, such as Hochrainer (2009) and Cavallo et al. (2010), attempt to solve the identication problem
by constructing articial counterfactuals. Yet, since synthetic control groupsare just that, synthetic, it does not
matter how inventive the empirical technique is. The analyses rely on real world data in which no true control
group exists.
6 In the case of Loayza et al. (2009), to less than half of the economies in the world. The e¤ect on Noys
(2009) sample is more unclear, but it is evident that a majority of the possible country-years are excluded.
7Note that this strategy is completely di¤erent from the use of alternative indicators, such as the windspeeds
or the Richter scale magnitudes of listed natural disasters, as it is done in, e.g., Anbarci et al. (2005) and Noy
(2009). The fundamental problem with these indicators is that they are only included when a natural disaster is
reported. High windspeeds or seismic events that did not result in a disaster are not included.
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3 Natural Disasters
The popular preconception that natural disasters must have a negative e¤ect on growth is
perhaps a consequence of the character of the few natural disasters that make international
headlines. Those disasters are unusually destructive. They are rare and atypical events. Yet
natural disasters are not rare phenomena. In any given year between 1990 and 2008, two-thirds
of all countries experienced at least one natural disaster, as dened by EM-DAT (2010). The
average number of natural disasters reported was 2.3 per year. The average number of people
that required immediate assistance was 1,5 million people per country and year or, as a share
of the population, 1.6 percent.
To see why the number of natural disasters, in general, and the number of geophysical disas-
ters, in particular, are appropriate indicators for natural disasters, the data must be described
in more detail.
3.1 Reported Natural Disasters
The widest collection of data about natural disasters is the EM-DAT (2010) database. An
absolute majority of the studies in the eld use this as their primary source of data. To be
included, events must meet at least one of following criteria: 10 or more reported killed; 100
people reported a¤ected (in need of immediate assistance); a declaration of a state of emergency;
or there is a call for international assistance. The sources are mainly United Nations agencies,
non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutions, and press agencies.
Natural hazards, that can become natural disasters in vulnerable environments, are in the
EM-DAT (2010) database divided into ve main categories. In order of decreasing frequency,
these are hydrological (oods, wet massmovements), meteorological (windstorms), biological
(epidemics, insect infestations), climatological (extreme temperatures, wildres, droughts), and
geophysical (earthquakes, including tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, dry massmovements).8
Data from EM-DAT cannot be used investigate the economic e¤ects of natural disasters
without problems. Strömberg (2007:201) nds systematic di¤erences in reporting across time,
level of income, and political regimes.He correctly notes that this complicates assessments of
what role such societal characteristics play for the direct natural disaster losses. Furthermore,
there is a clear risk that governments exaggerate damages in order to attract more humanitarian
aid. Section 4.3 expands on the issue of possible over- and underreporting in EM-DAT.
3.2 Seismicity
The instrumental variables used in this study build on seismic data. Seismic activity cause
earthquakes, whose location and timing still cannot be predicted. It is also the primary natural
cause of secondary event, such as tsunami, and it can trigger both volcanic eruptions and dry
massmovements.
8A natural disaster is a severe disruption in the functioning of a society, with far-reaching humanitarian,
material, economic or environmental damage that exceeds the coping capacity of the society in question(Schubert
et al. 2007:236).
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4 Empirical Analysis
The sample consists of 157 countries and covers the period from 1965 to 2008.
4.1 Natural Disaster Indicators
The main event indicator, Natural disasters, reects the number of reported events of all types
of natural disasters. The other event indicator used, Geophysical disasters, captures the num-
ber of geophysical disasters, which includes earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, and dry
massmovements. Both indicators are drawn from EM-DAT (2010). The loss indicators Natural
disasters: A¤ected and Natural disasters: Killed indicate the reported number of a¤ected or
killed as a fraction of total population. Natural disasters: Damages, also a loss indicator, cap-
tures disaster damages as a fraction of total GDP. All loss data for these variables are drawn
from EM-DAT (2010). In the following discussion, I have coded cases where no losses were
reported as zero losses.
The loss indicators are, at best, noisy indicators of actual losses. They can even be directly
misleading, as there are indications of systematic under- and overreporting. Underreporting
is an obvious problem in the EM-DAT data. Between 1965 and 2008, the number of people
killed as a percentage of population was zero in 21 percent of the observations where a natural
disaster is reported. The number of people a¤ected in percent of the population is zero for 16
percent, and economic damages in percent of GDP is zero for 52 percent of the observations
with a positive amount of disasters reported. This as an indication, not that there are natural
disaster with zero damages, but that there is a lot of missing information. That is, many if not
most of the zeros that any study using these indicators would bring into the empirical analysis
would be instances of missing data, rather than true zeros.
Data can be missing for the simple reason that no one really knows the number of dead or the
amount of damages. Another issue is deliberate overreporting. The 2010 Haitian earthquake
can serve as an example. News agencies have reported about a draft report commissioned by
the US government concluding that there may have been gross overreporting of losses. This is
not disputing the fact that many lives and much property was lost, but it illustrates how o¢ cial
estimates can be seriously misleading.9
4.2 Indicators of Seismicity
Data on the timing, magnitude, and location for seismic events with a magnitude of 5.5 or
more comes from Allen et al. (2009), a comprehensive list of global seismic events. The most
well-known measure of an earthquakes size is its magnitude on Richters magnitude scale. This
scale can be used to order earthquakes of di¤erent sizes, but it is not a measure of their de-
structive potential. The indicator of seismic events used in this paper is designed to capture the
potential damages to man-made structures. This variable, TNT, is an estimate of the seismic
9The conclusions in this report was that Reported casualties and economic damages may be greatly exag-
gerated,that the death toll [is] between 46,000 and 85,000 while Haitis government says about 316,000,that
many of those still living in tent cities did not lose their homes in the disaster, and that there was signicantly
less rubble around the countrys capital than previously thought(BBC 2011).
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energy released by all seismic events in TNT equivalents.10 It should be noted that TNT is an
approximation that does not take local surface and subsurface conditions into account.
4.3 Event vs. Loss Indicators
The loss indicators most relevant from a resource perspective are Natural disasters: Killed and
Natural disasters: Damages. The number of killed directly a¤ects human capital. Damages
directly a¤ects the capital stock. The distributions of these indicators are shown in Figure I,
where the 5,243 observations in the yearly sample used to estimate the specication in Column
1, Table III, are ordered horizontally in order of increasing severity or frequency. These variables
are heavily skewed, and the loss indicators more so than the event indicator.
A relatively small number of very serious disasters drag the means on the loss variables up to
well above the medians. How extreme these rare events are in relation to median losses becomes
apparent in a comparison of maximum values and values at the 99th percentile. As reported in
Table I, the maximum share of the population killed is 40 times higher than the share killed at
the 99th percentile.
[Figure I about here]
The median values in subsamples limited to observations with positive values reported in EM-
DAT are listed in Table II. A good majority of all natural disasters cause relatively few deaths,
and result in relatively limited damages. Among countries that report a natural disaster, less
than a tenth of a percent of the population is a¤ected, a share of 0.0001 percent of the population
is killed, and damages are zero percent of GDP (all gures are sample medians). This is in
countries that have a natural disaster. The numbers are somewhat higher for countries where
positive losses are reported. For instance, median economic damages in countries where damages
are reported is 0.05 percent of GDP. An obvious question to ask is what e¤ect on the aggregate
economy one should expect from such losses. Is it reasonable to expect relatively moderate losses
to have strong e¤ects on aggregate economic performance?
[Table I about here]
[Table II about here]
Suppose natural disasters could be understood from a purely scal perspective, where deaths
only a¤ected human capital (population size), and damages only a¤ected physical capital. First,
consider physical capital. Under the assumption that the capital stock in our sample is on average
twice that of annual GDP, simply divide the damage indicators, presented in Table I and II, by
two to get a rough estimate of the e¤ect on the capital stock.
10The rule of thumb is that an M4.0 earthquake releases seismic energy corresponding to the energy released
by the underground explosion of a thermonuclear bomb with a power equivalent to 1 kiloton of the conventional
explosive material TNT (trinitrotoluene). According to the Gutenberg-Richter magnitude-energy relation, each
unit higher magnitude is associated with 32 times more seismic energy being radiated. Hence, the energy radiated
by an M6.0 (M8.0) earthquake corresponds to 1 million (1,000 million) kilograms of TNT.
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At the 99th percentile, with 52 country-years with more serious damages, the damages add
up to slightly less than one percent of the capital stock. This could a¤ect aggregate growth,
but a country needs a only a one-year boost of two percentage points in the investment rate to
completely o¤set such damages. Second, human capital. The average annual population growth
in the sample is 1.9 percent. The median loss in life in countries that experience a natural
disaster is 0.0001 percent, and at the 99th percentile in the full sample the loss is 0.022 percent
of the population. These gures represent considerable human su¤ering, but would not make
more than a tiny bump on the growth of the human capital stock.
One should not without further justication expect these costs, in terms of human life and
damages to capital and buildings, to drastically weigh down aggregate economic performance. If
one nevertheless nds signicant e¤ects, one should consider understanding natural disasters as
discrete social and political events that a¤ect economic performance through social and political
mechanisms.
In this paper, the main indicators of natural disasters are the number of events. This have
several advantages. First, the number of events is a less skewed variable than are indicators
that relate losses to the size of the population or total production. As such they will give more
precise estimates. Second, the number of reported events is probably a less noisy indicator of
the actual number of events, than, say, the reported number of killed is of the actual number of
killed.
Third, endogeneity will be a smaller problem with event indicators. Losses are greater
in poorly functioning countries. When economic growth is regressed on a loss indicator, the
estimate will therefore su¤er from a negative bias. This source of bias, which may explain
some of the strong negative results in the literature, can here be avoided with the use of event
indicators.11 Fourth, there are exogenous instruments for the number of events, based on seismic
data, that can be used to infer a causal link from natural disasters to growth.
The nal argument in support of using event variables for this study is that one of the main
argument in favour of the loss variables is not a very good argument. The argument in favor is
that loss indicators separate more serious events from less serious events. Given that losses are
typically in the order of mere fractions of a percent of the population or national income, there
is no obvious reason why they should be linearly related to aggregate economic growth.
4.4 Regression Analysis
The multivariate analysis starts with an estimation of the following dynamic econometric model,
yit   yit 1 = yt 1 + Dit + x0i;t 1 + t + i + it;
where yit is log income per capita in country i in period t. Since this makes the model
dynamic, xed e¤ects OLS results would su¤er from a dynamic panel bias. In longer panels,
as the one we have in the yearly sample with 43 periods, this problem is limited. In shorter
panels, which we have when we estimate this model using 2-year and 5-year panel data sam-
ples, it can be more problematic. For this reason, we check the robustness of the results with
11As already mentioned, there are less losses in rich countries, even if they do not experience fewer natural
disasters. A full investigation of the distribution of events and losses is beyond the scope of this paper.
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two consistent estimators, an Anderson-Hsiao IV estimator (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982) and a
di¤erence-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Our main interest lies in the estimate of
Dit, the number of natural disasters during t. The other key covariates are included in the vector
x ; international trade as a fraction of GDP (Openness), government expenditures as a fraction
of GDP (Government Size), and Polity IVs main combined democracy indicator (Polity2 ). t
represents time xed e¤ects, i country xed e¤ects, and it is an error term.
12 More detailed
variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix.
In Table III, we use yearly data. Disasters in the present year have no e¤ect on the aggregate
income level. The coe¢ cient for natural disasters becomes signicant only in the year after the
disasters have taken place, and it is then positive, not negative. Though this is not the rst
nding of a positive association between economic growth and natural disasters, the results are
remarkable as they are visible already in the short-run, and among a representative group of
countries.
Natural disasters are neither unpredictable nor random events, even if countries di¤er greatly
in their natural vulnerability. The xed e¤ects results in Columns 1 to 3 estimate the role of
within-country variation in the number of disasters, so the results should not be driven by
between-country di¤erences in disaster exposure and preparedness. What they show is not that
exposed countries always grow faster, but that they grow faster at times when they experience
natural disasters. A relevant question is whether we would nd the same association when we
included both within and between-country variation. The last column estimates a model where
the country xed e¤ects, i, have been dropped. The pooled OLS estimate is weaker than
the xed e¤ects e¤ect, but it nevertheless shows that on average, one can expect a signicant
positive association between economic growth and lagged natural disasters.
[Table III here]
Given that natural disaster in the present year neither have a signicantly negative or sig-
nicantly positive association with present income, while lagged disasters have a positive one,
it is natural to ask whether the total short-run association over these two years also is positive.
Table IV answers that question. Natural disasterst still captures the number of reported nat-
ural disaster events during period t, with the di¤erence compared to Table III being that t is a
two-year period. Log GDP per capitat is the end of the 2-year period income level. The positive
association is signicant both in xed e¤ects and pooled OLS. Since the number of periods is
lower than in the yearly sample, it becomes necessary to address the dynamic panel bias. Col-
umn 3 does this with an Anderson-Hsiao IV estimator and Column 4 uses the more e¢ cient
Arellano-Bond di¤erence-GMM estimator. In both cases, I nd that the estimates are slightly
lower than the xed e¤ects result, but they are still positive and statistically signicant. Based
on the ndings presented in Tables III and IV, we believe one must accept that the short-run
association between natural disasters and economic growth is positive on average.
12 In the pooled and xed e¤ects OLS estimations, two-way clustered standard errors are used when possible,
and then serial autocorrelation adjusted for when found. The Anderson-Hsiao and dynamic-GMM estimates use
robust standard errors, in the latter case with Windmeijer correction.
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[Table IV here]
[Table V here]
In Table V, the specications in Table IV are reestimated on a 5-year sample, thus capturing
the medium-term association between natural disasters and economic growth. Natural disasterst
is the number of disasters during the present 5-year period, and Log GDP per capitat is the end
of the ve-year period income level. . The results are quite similar to those presented in Table
III, with the execption of the pooled OLS estimate that is considerably lower. The xed e¤ects
OLS, the Anderson-Hsiao IV estimate and the di¤erence-GMM estimate are slightly stronger
in the 5-year sample than in the 2-year sample, which suggests that the positive mechanisms
dominate the negative mechanisms even more when we move to longer time horizons. The
longest time horizon possible is the full 43 year period from 1965 to 2008. Table VI presents
cross-sectional results for the 80 to 87 countries for which we can track all key variables over
the whole period. Naturally, these results cannot address unobserved heterogeneity between
countries.13 With this caveat, we observe that the association between natural disaster events
and economic growth is here even stronger than in both the short- and the medium-run. Over
time, it appears that countries that su¤er from more natural disasters actually do better than
countries that su¤er from less natural disasters. This is not disputing that natural disasters
have many negative outcomes, it merely shows that the average e¤ect on economic growth does
not seem to be one of them.
[Table VI here]
4.5 Instrumental variables results
We have argued that loss indicators are endogenous, which makes results using such indicators
unreliable, but also that endogeneity is less of a problem when one uses event indicators. To
use event indicators does not completely remove the threat to identication posed by reversed
causality (simultaneity). There is good reason to expect some endogeneity in all indicators of
reported natural disasters as hazardous natural events are more likely to become natural disasters
in vulnerable environments with, e.g., a lack of democracy, poor institutions, or low income levels.
These are all factors that a¤ect income via channels other than natural disasters. If more natural
disasters occur in countries with low levels on factors that are good for growth, then also xed
e¤ects estimates will have a negative bias. Problems with over- and underreporting tells us that
Natural disasters is an imperfect indicator of all relevant natural events. The logical next step
is to instrument for disaster events, which we can do for a subset of Natural disasters, namely
Geophysical disaster.14 The instrumental variables procedure used here involves using seismic
13 I add the additional control variables Log area, the log of the physical size of the country, and Latitude, the
distance from the equator, to the cross-section specications to somewhat reduce this problem.
14For a general critique on the use of instruments, see Deaton (2010).
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data to instrument for reported geophysical natural disasters.15 At a rst approximation, seismic
events are most closely tied to the number of earthquakes, yet they can cause also tsunami, dry
massmovements, and can trigger volcanic eruptions. Together these disasters make up the
category geophysical natural disasters.
[Table VII here]
[Table VIII here]
The instrumental variables results are presented in Tables VII, which uses two-year data,
and VIII, which uses cross-sectional data. The results are mixed. When not instrumented
for, Geophysical disasters have a positive association with income in the two-year panel. This
relationship completely disappears when we use our indicator of destructive potential of seismic
events (TNT ) to instrument for reported Geophysical disasters. In principle, this could be
because the e¤ect is not identied, in the sense that the rst stage fails due to weak instruments,
or because there is no short-run e¤ect of geophysical natural disasters on income per capita, once
endogeneity is properly addressed. The fact that TNT is highly signicant in the rst stage
and the rst stage F-value is decent is, albeit not conclusive, evidence in favor of the latter
interpretation. That is, on average there really is no, positive or negative, short-run e¤ect of
geophysical natural disasters. Since the results using (not instrumented) Natural disasters, see
Table IV, indicated a positive association with income, we conclude that the average e¤ect of
natural disasters probably lies in the range of positive to none. Importantly, we nd no evidence
of a negative short-run e¤ect.
The cross-sectional IV results in Table VIII, tell us that the long-run the e¤ects are positive,
and stronger than what standard cross-sectional OLS would suggest. In Column 3 of Table VIII,
we remove all countries that had no seismic activity between 1965 and 2008 to ensure that the
instrument does not simply capture di¤erences between countries with and countries without
seismic activity. We add the indicator of destructive potential (TNT ) directly in Column 4,
and nd that countries with more seismic activity gained economically during this period. In
contrast to the results from the two-year panel, the cross-section IV results fully support the
standard cross-section results - countries that experience more natural disasters grow faster in
the long run.
4.6 Mechanisms
The emprical framework prevents us from separating out the e¤ects of disasters that have more
severe consequences in terms of direct losses. The results reect the average e¤ect of disasters
over the full range of disaster destruction, from truly devastating wide-ranging disasters to
disasters with limited consequences.16 Although a full analysis of the potential mechanisms
15The key di¤erence between the number of geophysical disasters listed in the EM-DAT, and indicators of
seismic events, is that the former is an endogenous variable while the latter is not.
16Under the assumption that some disasters may have a negative e¤ect on economic growth, the positive e¤ects
of other disasters must be even stronger than the estimated coe¢ cients suggest.
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behind these averages is beyond the scope of this paper, we propose that a key explanation
can be a positive interaction with the inow of emergency and distress relief from international
donors. The denition of the key variable Humanitarian aid is, following OECD-DAC (2010),
the per capita amount of emergency and distress relief in cash or in kind, including emergency
response, relief food aid, short-term reconstruction relief and rehabilitation, disaster prevention
and preparedness.
Earlier studies using loss indicators tend to nd that the negative e¤ect is stronger among
developing countries (Noy 2009). We argue that the endogeneity introduced by loss indicators
may explain such ndings. Here, where an econometrically less problematic event indicator is
used, it appears that the positive association between natural disasters and economic perfor-
mance is only found among developing countries. In Column 1, only industrialized (OECD)
countries are included in the sample, and there is no signicant relationship between natural
disasters and income. In Column 2, only developing countries (non-OECD) are included, and
then the e¤ect is much stronger than in the full sample (compare with Column 4, Table V).
The lack of signicant results in OECD countries may be because industrialized countries also
tend to have more solid democracies, a factor known to be associated with, e.g., more investments
in disaster prevention. In results not shown, the full sample was split into observations with
democracy (a lagged Polity2 greater than or equal to zero) and observations without democracy.
The estimates for Natural disasters was insignicant in both samples. A reason for this could be
that the democracy sample contains both industrialized democracies and democratic developing
countries, and the e¤ect of natural disasters is not homogenous over this division. This becomes
apparant when we make a further split of the non-OECD sample in Columns 3 and 4 along
the same democracy dimension. The positive association is limited to democratic developing
countries.
[Table IX here]
The potential mechanism most clearly in the hands of the international community is that of
humanitarian aid. More disaster relief (in absolute terms) goes to poorer countries that are hit
by disasters with a higher number of people a¤ected or killed (Strömberg 2007). Democracies
are more open in general, more available for an inow of international aid and assistance, and
also receive humanitarian aid more often than non-democracies. It is also likely that a larger
fraction of the inow goes to the right things in democracies, rather than disappears in the form
of corruption. We propose that the inow of humanitarian aid, and the associated international
attention, is a key factor to understand why the natural disasters are positively associated with
subsequent economic performance only in democratic developing countries.17
Before we add humanitarian aid directly in Columns 5 and 6, we separate countries not
receiving humanitarian aid in the previous period from countries receiving humanitarian aid.
All else equal, countries that recieved aid in the previous period should be more likely to do so
17For insightful discussions on the components of humanitarian aid, see Strömberg (2007) and Fearon (2006).
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also in this period when they su¤er from a natural disaster.18 Donors are more likely to have a
functioning system for providing assistance already in place, and political obstacles to providing
aid are arguably less of a problem for these countries. To split the sample on past rather than
present aid inow is a way to reduce potential endogeneity caused by such a sample split. The
result is clear - only if there was an inow of humanitarian aid in the last period is the estimate
signicant. This is an indication that the positive association between natural disasters and
economic performance in democratic developing countries is because they are more likely to
receive humanitarian aid. It could be this inow of humanitarian aid that makes the net e¤ect
positive.
When we add humanitarian aid as well as an interaction term directly to the sample of
democratic developing countries, only the interaction between Natural disasters and Humani-
tarian aid per capita is signicantly positive. With the caveat that this does not settle causality,
this illustrates that perhaps neither disasters nor aid inows have a positive e¤ects on income
on their own, but jointly they do. Natural disasters appear to boost economic performance if
followed by more aid, or, perhaps, natural disaster are good for the overall economy only be-
cause they attract foreign aid. If either of these interpretations are correct, countries shocked
by natural disasters can improve their economic performance when they are assisted by the
international community. It is worth emphasizing that this result holds in the the sample of
democratic developing countries, but that it cannot be generalized to the full sample.
To sum up, the positive association between natural disasters and income per capita is
stronger among non-OECD members and especially among democratic non-OECD members.
The positive association is only found among countries that received humanitarian aid, while
there is neither a positive nor a negative association when there is zero inow of humanitarian
aid.
[Table V about here]
5 Concluding Remarks
Natural disasters can be terrible events. In already poor countries, thousands die each year in
natural disasters, and considerable amounts of physical capital are destroyed. The international
community often seeks to help disaster victims by sending humanitarian aid. It is worth asking
whether more aid can be motivated also with reference to the negative growth e¤ects of natural
disasters. In this paper, we provide evidence to the contrary. The focus is on keeping the
sample as representative as possible, to avoid including too many control variables, and to
embrace endogeneity rather than assume exogeneity.
Natural disasters in general, and geophysical disasters in particular, are not associated with
poor economic performance. In fact, countries hit by natural disasters tend to have higher in-
comes, both in the short-, medium, and long-run. The long-run e¤ects are both stronger and
18Since the specications are estimated with di¤erence-GMM, the results are not driven by systematic time-
invariant di¤erences between countries. Also, in the sample used here, there is no indication that the inow of
humanitarian aid (in relative terms) is determined by the severity of disasters. The ve-year sample correlations
between Humanitarian aid per capita and all three loss indicators (A¤ected, Killed, Damages) are practically
zero and far from signicant. I conjecture that Humanitarian aid per capita captures something else than the
seriousness of the disaster.
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causal. Economic and political development matters. Positive e¤ects in democratic develop-
ing countries that have recieved humanitarian aid appears to be driving the overall positive
association between natural disaster events and economic performance.
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Appendix
Variable Descriptions
Democracyt 1. Indicates a Polity2-score of zero or higher in previous period.
Geophysical disasters. Number of geophysical disasters (earthquake including tsunami, vol-
canic eruption, dry massmovement) reported. Source: EM-DAT (2010).
Government Size. The government share of real GDP per capita. Source: Heston, Summers,
and Aten (2009).
Humanitarian aid per capita. The inow of humanitarian aid divided by population size
lagged once. OECD (2010) denes this as emergency and distress relief in cash or in kind,
including emergency response, relief food aid, short-term reconstruction relief and rehabilitation,
disaster prevention and preparedness. Excludes aid to refugees in donor countries.Countries
for which no aid inow is listed are assumed to have received no aid in that year. Source: OECD
(2010) and Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009).
Latitude. Absolute latitude of capital (divided by 90). Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
Log area. The natural log of physical area. Source: Cepii (2010).
Log GDP per capita. The natural log of the real GDP per capita, in constant USD (2000).
Source: World Development Indicators.
Natural disasters. Number of natural disaster events reported. The main natural disaster
categories are hydrological, meteorological, biological, climatological, and geophysical natural
disasters. Source: EM-DAT (2010).
Natural disasters: A¤ected. Number of persons a¤ected by a natural disaster as a fraction
of (lagged) population size. Source: EM-DAT (2010) and Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009).
Natural disasters: Damages. Estimated damages due to natural disasters as a fraction of
(lagged) GDP. Source: EM-DAT (2010) and Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009).
Natural disasters: Killed. Number of killed by natural disasters as a fraction of (lagged)
population size. Source: EM-DAT (2010) and Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009).
OECD1970. Indicates that a country was a member of OECD in 1970.
Openness. Total trade (imports plus exports) as a percentage of GDP (real). Source: Heston,
Summers, and Aten (2009).
Polity2. The revised combined Polity2-score. Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2002).
TNT. Annual destructive potential of seismic events during t. To avoid the inuence of
extreme outliers, magnitudes are capped at M8.0. Estimations are made with TNT rst replaced
by TNT divided by 109 and then included in log form. Set to  13 if TNT = 0 before logging,
in order to retain a representative sample. Source: Allen et al. (2009).
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Figure I. Comparison of Natural Disaster Indicators
(The observations are ordered horizontally with increasing severity or frequency to the right)
Tables
TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Annual data
N MEAN ST.DEV. MIN P50 P99 MAX
Log GDP per capita 5243 7.414 1.585 4.131 7.278 10.462 10.769
Geophysical disasters 5243 0.183 0.658 0 0 3 11
Government size 5089 18.028 9.658 1.438 15.584 57.320 83.350
Latitude 5240 0.275 0.187 0 0.233 0.689 0.711
Natural disasters 5243 1.704 3.221 0 1 17 37
Natural disasters: A¤ected 5243 1.514 7.057 0 0 33.780 111.008
Natural disasters: Damages 5243 0.097 0.831 0 0 1.945 37.197
Natural disasters: Killed 5243 0.002 0.024 0 0 0.021 0.826
Openness 5089 71.045 46.235 7.008 59.702 215.684 456.561
Polity2 5239 1.339 7.410 -10 3 10 10
TNT 5243 -10.773 3.611 -13 -13 -0.918 0.890
Notes:
Descriptive statistics for the sample used to estimate the specication in Table III, Column 1.
TABLE II
NATURAL DISASTER INDICATORS: MEDIAN VALUES
Annual data
Full Natural disasters Natural disasters Natural disasters: Natural disasters:
Sample >0 A¤ected>0 Killed>0 Damages>0
Natural disasters 1 2 2 2 3
Natural disasters: A¤ected 0 0.0804 0.1755 0.1037 0.2087
Natural disasters: Damages 0 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Natural disasters: Killed 0 0 0.0001 0.0007 0.0473
Observations 5243 2941 2461 2322. 1415
Fraction with positive values reported
when disaster(s) reported.
84% 79% 48%
Notes:
The loss indicators are expressed in percentage of the population (Natural disasters: A¤ected and Natural disasters: Killed) or
GDP (Natural disasters: Damages).
TABLE III
NATURAL DISASTERS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Annual data 1965-2008
Dependent Variable Log GDP per capitat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed e¤ects OLS Fixed e¤ects OLS Fixed e¤ects OLS Pooled OLS
Log GDP per capitat 1 or t 2 0.970*** 0.927*** 0.927*** 1.002***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.001)
Natural disasterst 1.066 1.265 -0.029
(0.728) (1.026) (0.511)
Natural disasterst 1 3.105** 2.447** 1.382***
(1.427) (0.968) (0.451)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,240 5,237 5,237 5,276
Notes:
In parentheses are two-way (country and year) clustered standard errors, robust to arbitrary autocorrelation. *** / ** / * indicate
p-values below 0.01 / 0.05 / 0.1. Unreported constants, time xed e¤ects, and lagged levels of Openness, Government size, and
Polity2, are included in all specications. Specications in Columns 1-3 (C1-C3) estimated with (linear) Fixed E¤ects, and C4
estimated with Ordinary Least Squares. The control variables are lagged once in C1 and twice in Columns 2-4. Coe¢ cients and
standard errors for the natural disaster variables are scaled up by a factor of 1000. Subscript t means that data represent time
period t, here a one year period.
TABLE IV
NATURAL DISASTERS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
2-year data 1966-2008
Dependent Variable Log GDP per capitat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed e¤ects OLS Pooled OLS AndersonHsiao
IV
Arellano-Bond
di¤erence-GMM
Log GDP per capitat 1 0.926*** 1.003*** 0.542*** 0.593***
(0.014) (0.002) (0.150) (0.080)
Natural disasterst 2.183** 1.344** 1.512* 1.812**
(0.852) (0.680) (0.819) (0.854)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR (2) test 0.523
Hansen J test 0.385
Observations 2,563 2,565 2,409 2,409
Notes:
In parentheses are standard errors. In Columns 1-2 (C1-C2), two-way (country and year) clustered standard errors, robust to
arbitrary autocorrelation. In C3, standard errors clustered on country. In C4, standard errors are Windmeijer-corrected appropriate
for small samples. *** / ** / * indicate p-values below 0.01 / 0.05 / 0.1. Unreported constants, time xed e¤ects, and lagged
levels of Openness, Government size, and Polity2, are included in all specications. C1 estimated with Fixed e¤ects OLS and
C2 estimated with Pooled OLS. C3 is estimated with an Anderson-Hsiao IV estimator. C4 is estimated with Arellano-Bonds
di¤erence-GMM estimator where the rst 5 appropriate lags are used as internal instruments for the lagged values of Log GDP
per capita, Openness, Government size, and Polity2, while Natural disasters and the time xed e¤ects are is treated as exogenous
variables. The instrument matrix is collapsed, as recommended by Roodman (2006).The p-value for the Arellano-Bond test for
autocorrelation of the second order is reported under AR (2) test. The p-value for an over-identication test is reported under
Hansen J test. If rejected, this test indicates that the instruments as a group are invalid. Coe¢ cients and standard errors for the
natural disaster variable are scaled up by a factor of 1000. Subscript t means that data represent time period t, here a two year
period.
TABLE V
NATURAL DISASTERS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
5-year data 1965-2005
Dependent Variable Log GDP per capitat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed e¤ects OLS Pooled OLS AndersonHsiao
IV
Arellano-Bond
di¤erence-GMM
Log GDP per capitat 1 0.795*** 1.003*** 0.415* 0.561***
(0.033) (0.001) (0.246) (0.119)
Natural disasterst 2.543** 0.269** 2.009* 2.112*
(1.036) (0.135) (1.113) (1.126)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR (2) test 0.468
Hansen J test 0.364
Observations 932 951 783 783
Notes:
In parentheses are standard errors. In Columns 1-2 (C1-C2), two-way (country and year) clustered standard errors, robust to
arbitrary autocorrelation. In C3, standard errors clustered on country. In C4, standard errors are Windmeijer-corrected appropriate
for small samples. *** / ** / * indicate p-values below 0.01 / 0.05 / 0.1. Unreported constants, time xed e¤ects, and lagged
levels of Openness, Government size, and Polity2, are included in all specications. C1 estimated with Fixed e¤ects OLS and
C2 estimated with Pooled OLS. C3 is estimated with an Anderson-Hsiao IV estimator. C4 is estimated with Arellano-Bonds
di¤erence-GMM estimator where the rst 5 appropriate lags are used as internal instruments for the lagged values of Log GDP
per capita, Openness, Government size, and Polity2, while Natural disasters and the time xed e¤ects are is treated as exogenous
variables. The instrument matrix is collapsed, as recommended by Roodman (2006). The p-value for the Arellano-Bond test for
autocorrelation of the second order is reported under AR (2) test. The p-value for an over-identication test is reported under
Hansen J test. If rejected, this test indicates that the instruments as a group are invalid. Coe¢ cients and standard errors for the
natural disaster variable are scaled up by a factor of 1000. Subscript t means that data represent time period t, here a ve year
period.
TABLE VI
NATURAL DISASTERS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Cross-section 1965-2008
Dependent Variable Log GDP per capita2008
(1) (2) (3)
Log GDP per capita1965 1.156*** 1.010*** 1.018***
(0.036) (0.050) (0.064)
Natural disasters1965 2008 2.885*** 3.940*** 4.070***
(0.998) (1.056) (1.143)
Log area & Latitude No Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes
Observations 87 87 80
Notes:
In parentheses are robust standard errors. *** / ** / * indicate p-values below 0.01
/ 0.05 / 0.1. Unreported constants included in all specications. The Additional
controls included in Column 3 are initial level of Openness, Government size, and
Polity2. Estimated with OLS. Coe¢ cients and standard errors for the natural
disaster variables are scaled up by a factor of 1000.
TABLE VII
GEOPHYSICAL DISASTERS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
2-year data 1966-2008, Instrumental variables
Dependent Variable Log GDP per capitat
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed e¤ects OLS Fixed e¤ects IV Fixed e¤ects OLS
A. Fixed E¤ects / Second stage results
Log GDP per capitat 1 0.928*** 0.940*** 0.932***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.016)
Geophysical disasterst 5.542* -12.215
(2.903) (9.422)
TNTt -1.106
(0.853)
B. First stage results
TNTt 0.091***
(0.014)
F (excluded instrument) 43.88
Anderson-Rubin test 0.195
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,563 2,563 2,563
Notes:
In parentheses are robust standard errors. *** / ** / * indicate p-values below 0.01 / 0.05 /
0.1. Unreported constants, time xed e¤ects, and lagged levels of Openness, Government size,
and Polity2, are included in all specications. The specications in Columns 1 and 3 (C1 and
C3) are estimated with Fixed E¤ects OLS. C2 is estimated with two-step GMM with xed e¤ects.
The Anderson-Rubin test is a weak-instrument robust test of whether the endogenous variable has
a signicant e¤ect on the dependent variable. The reported gure is the p-value for that test.
Coe¢ cients and standard errors for the Geophysical disasters are in Panel A scaled up by a factor
of 1000. Subscript t means that data represent time period t, here a two-year period. Geophysical
disasterst is the sum of Geophysical disastersysical natural disasters per country and two-year
period. TNTt is the logged sum of TNT per country and two-year period. When the sum is zero
before being logged, we substitute the missing logged value with -13.
TABLE VIII
GEOPHYSICAL NATURAL DISASTERS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Cross-section 1965-2008, Instrumental variables
Dependent Variable Log GDP per capita2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV OLS
A. Fixed E¤ects / Second stage results
Log GDP per capita1965 0.950*** 0.968*** 0.920*** 0.856***
(0.074) (0.073) (0.069) (0.099)
Geophysical disasters1965 2008 13.823*** 18.698*** 14.706***
(3.658) (5.359) (4.920)
TNT1965 2008 43.938***
(14.215)
B. First stage results
TNT1965 2008 2.235*** 3.162***
(0.565) (0.766)
F (excluded instrument) 17.27 17.05
Anderson-Rubin test 0.002 0.006
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seismic activity 1965-2008 Only No No Yes No
Observations 80 80 68 80
Notes:
In parentheses are robust standard errors. *** / ** / * indicate p-values below 0.01 / 0.05 / 0.1. Unreported constants, Log
Area, Latitude, and initial level of Openness, Government size, and Polity2 are included in all specications. The specications in
Columns 1 and 4 (C1 and C4) are estimated with OLS. C2 and C3 are estimated with two-step GMM. The Anderson-Rubin test is
a weak-instrument robust test of whether the endogenous variable has a signicant e¤ect on the dependent variable. The reported
gures are the p-values for that test. Coe¢ cients and standard errors for the Geophysical disasters are in Panel A scaled up by a
factor of 1000. Geophysical disasters1965 2008 is the sum of Geophysical disastersysical natural disasters per country between 1965
and 2008. TNT1965 2008 is the logged sum of the annual TNT per country between 1965 and 2008. When the sum is zero before
being logged, we substitute the missing logged value with -13
TABLE IX
NATURAL DISASTERS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
MECHANISMS
5-year data 1965-2005
Dependent Variable Log GDP per capitat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Arrelano-Bond di¤erence-GMM
Log GDP per capitat 1 0.679*** 0.565*** 0.607 0.470** 0.639 0.579** 0.739*** 0.642***
(0.164) (0.166) (0.409) (0.207) (0.427) (0.245) (0.268) (0.195)
Natural disasterst 3.088 15.900** 9.367 14.369** -0.117 16.645** 6.715 0.977
(5.407) (6.658) (22.075) (7.115) (4.527) (8.234) (7.452) (0.947)
Humanitarian aid per capitat 381.496 160.246
(493.915) (325.066)
Natural disasterst  Humani-
tarian aid per capitat
578.445** 77.314
(286.745) (55.609)
OECD1970 Yes No No No - - No -
Democracyt 1 - - No Yes - - Yes -
Humanitarian aid inowt 1 - - - - No Yes - -
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(2) test 0.976 0.382 0.409 0.344 0.890 0.233 0.490 0.956
Hansen J test 0.137 0.482 0.447 0.348 0.773 0.264 0.818 0.493
Observations 138 645 354 291 339 444 291 783
Notes:
In parentheses are Windmeijer-corrected standard errors appropriate for small samples. *** / ** / * indicate p-values below 0.01 /
0.05 / 0.1. Unreported constants, time xed e¤ects, and lagged levels of Openness, Government size, and Polity2, are included in
all specications. Estimated with Arellano-Bonds di¤erence-GMM estimator. In the specications in Columns 2 to 7 (C2-C7), the
rst 3 appropriate lags are used as internal instruments for the lagged values of Log GDP per capita, Openness, Government size,
and Polity2, while Natural disasters, Humanitarian aid per capita, the interaction between Natural disasters and Humanitarian
aid per capita, and the time xed e¤ects are is treated as exogenous variables. In C1, only 2 lags are used to keep the instrument
count below the number of countries in the sample used. The instrument matrix is collapsed, as recommended by Roodman (2006).
The p-value for the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of the second order is reported under AR (2) test. The p-value for an
over-identication test is reported under Hansen J test. If rejected, this test indicates that the instruments as a group are invalid.
Coe¢ cients and standard errors for natural disasters and humanitarian aid are scaled up by a factor of 1000. Subscript t means
that data represent time period t, here a 5-year period. OECD1970 indicates that the country was a member of OECD in 1970.
Democracyt 1 indicates a Polity2-score of zero or more in the previous period. Humanitarian aid inowt 1 indicates positive inow
of humanitarian aid in the previous period.
